INTRODUCTION
The robustness of a software component is a measure of how it functions in the presence of exceptional inputs or stressful environmental conditions [IO] . Software robustness is gaining more and more significance among application developers. The reasons are three-fold: First, our lives are becoming more "computerized. Traditional analog devices are being replaced by their cheaper digital counterparts. The use of micro-controllers is growing in automobiles, airplanes, weapons, medical devices, consumer products, etc. New services based on computerized facilities are also emerging. Hence, more and more aspects of our life are dependent on software.
Second, in order to cut development cost and time, application developers are being pressured to use Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software modules or legacy software components to assemble applications [1] [2] . Often, COTS software components are optimized for cost or performance, and have not been specifically designed to operate in mission-critical or application-critical systems. COTS components may function correctly under normal conditions, but they may crash, hang or exhibit other robustness failures when exceptional or unspecified conditions occur.
Third, robustness may not have been a design priority in COTS software. With the shortening of software product cycles and shrinking of profit margins, development cost is becoming a dominant concern along with time-to-market. High performance and new functionality, as opposed to robustness, are often given first priority.
A particular source of robustness problems is exceptional inputs. As many as two-thirds of system crashes might be caused by exceptionhandling failures. Decades ago, the Apollo I 1 Lunar Lander computer rebooted three times due to exceptional operating conditions, nearly causing an aborted mission. More recently, the maiden flight of the Ariane 5 rocket failed, with an estimated loss of $500 million, due to an improperly handled exception in the software of the dual-redundant on-board control computer 131.
There is every indication that exception handling will continue to be a problem in critical applications, and may well become a serious problem in everyday computing as well. To make matters worse, the trend to using COTS software may mean that a lack of source code or detailed specifications will make improving robustness of systems even more challenging than it has been in the past with custom-written software. [7] . The randomness of these approaches and their dependence on concurrent execution of many tests makes any robustness failures that are found difficult to reproduce and isolate.
The Xept [E] project at Bell Labs has developed an instrumentation tool to intercept library function calls to link in error detection and error recovery code. It provides a language to write specifications for interception and handling code for functions, and an objectcode instrumentation tool, called Xmangler, to link application code with error detection and error recovery code. Although not focused on automated code generation technique, Xept provides a convenient framework and proves that a software wrapper can be used to intercept library function calls in object code.
TOWARD AUTOMATIC ROBUSTNESS HARDENING
Our goal is to automate the process of testing and hardening COTS and legacy software modules against robustness failures triggered by exceptional inputs. The process works as follows:
1.
2.

3.
4.
i n t readcfile descriptor, buffer, bytes to read) I [2] is used to measure the severity of the robustness failures. The testing method and the CRASH scale metric are described in the remainder of this section.
The Combinatorial Testing Method
A combinatorial testing methodology is used to generate tests. As an example, testing of the POSlX function call r e a d is shown in Figure 1 . The system call r e a d accepts three parameters, f d * f i l e des, c h a r * b u f f e r , and i n t s i z e . 
The Dimensionality Model [Ill
The idea of dimensionality is illustrated by two definitions.
Parameter dimensionality: Consider a software module f, taking a list of arguments (XI, x2, . . . ) . T h e parameter dimensionality is defined as the number of arguments taken by the software module.
For example, the POSlX function read(fi1e-des, buffer, bytes to read) takes three parameters, so its parameter dimensionality is three.
There is also a special case that a function accepts no parameters at all, which is beyond the scope of this model. 
Automatic Identification of Fault Dimensionality
Robustness failure dimensionality indicates the number of concurrent triggers required to activate a particular robustness failure. If we could automate the process of determining robustness failure dimensionality, we would be able to know the exceptional parameter values that are responsible for observed failures. This is an important step toward automatic hardening.
While intuitively parameter dimensionality is the number of parameters accepted by the function, robustness failure dimensionality is not immediately obvious for functions with parameter dimensionality higher than one. However, the dimensionality can be revealed by the pattern of the robustness responses observed during testing. As an example, Figure 2 
test, data types or the test case values
Automated Protection Code Generation
For integer, floating-point data types and NULL pointers, value checking is sufficient to detect exceptional values. Therefore, the process of protection code generation for these data types are is straightforward. After the dimensionality information is revealed and the exceptional values found, value comparison statements against these exceptional values are generated and plugged into a skeleton wrapper program. Any call to the target function to be protected is redirected to the wrapper. This call redirection can be achieved using a tool such as Xmangler [E].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the experiment, we have implemented 1-dimensional failure hardening for integer, floating-point, and NULL pointer data values
We selected NULL pointer in our experimental study on an intuitive basis. NULL pointers are one of the most commonly encountered of exceptional inputs and are easily overlooked. While processing the data gathered in POSIX API testing, the extraordinarily high failure rate of NULL drew immediate attention. We estimate that the overall test result will be 10% The failure depicted in Figure  3 happens because the validity of the file pointer is not properly checked by POSlX function f g e t c ( ) . To protect the program against this failure, function f g e t c ( ) is tested by the Ballista robustness testing suite. The robustness failures related to file pointer are found in the test result file, shown in Table  1 . In Table 1 The actual code segment in the template file that generates the test cases for fpxx is shown in Figure 4 . For the case of fpxx-NOTEXIST, the Value is equivalent to a NULL file pointer.
Based on this knowledge, we can generate protection code guarding against this value. In this case, a checking statement will be sufficient to intercept the NULL file pointer causing the failure. The generated header file for fgetc is shown in Figure 5 .
The call h-fgetc() is the hardened version of fgetc ( ) with embedded NULL file pointer checking. Using the Xmangler tool, we will be able to redirect call instances from fsetc ( ) t o the Ballista test suite, this is the denotation for a non-existent file, equivalent to a NULL file pointer. The analyzer comes to this conclusion by sorting the testing results by parameter h fgetc ( ) endif /*-HARDENED-FGETC-*/ igure 5. Generated protection file for fgetc() user source file to finish the last linking phase.
To verify the effectiveness of the generated protection tile for fgetc ( ) , we first tested it again using the Ballista testing suite. As expected, the above three robustness failures are replaced by successes with error return code 99. Second, we compile this header file together with the user function shown in Figure  3(a) . As shown in Figure 6 , the exceptional inputs are captured. The function returns with a warning message.
In the experiment, the hardened version of fgetc ( ) simply turns Abort failures into a default error return code. To achieve more flexibility, we can provide more options before exiting. For example, for resource related problems, retrying the task sometimes can fix the problem. Process migration can keep a long-running task from aborting when facing resource contention. Garbage collection or disk de-fragmentation can also be launched at some point if a problem is related to memory or disk resources. For the parameter values that are not in the testing database, or are
Reading d a t a f i l e Dangerous 1-Dimensional p a r a m e t e r v a l u e d e t e c t e d Figure 6 . Output of the user program after hardening
V. FUTURE WORK
Although the experimental results to date are successful and promising, the following aspects should be considered to make the process more practical for hardening generic user software.
Scale the hardening capability to encompass more data types.
Simple data types are probably easier to protect than complex parameters such as data structures. The challenge is to protect these complex data types while avoiding false alarms.
Implement random sampling to increase dimensionality analysis confidence.
Because the Failure Analyzer bases its conclusion purely on the test response pattern, validation testing by random sampling before reaching a conclusion will increase prediction accuracy and avoid at least some false alarms.
Using this tool, we will be able to protect COTS modules at the object code level. No source code is required to harden a module.
Adopt the Xmangler tool introduced in [E].
Add on user-defined hooks to direct exceptional input value handling to user functions.
ambiguous, checkpoint-rollback procedure can be called to save and restore system state.
Optimize protection code efficiency to reduce run-time cost.
Vi. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this research is to explore the possibility of generating robustness failure protection code automatically. We have been successful in achieving limited results for integers, floating point numbers, and NULL pointer values. This proves that automatic protection code generation for COTS software is feasible. It remains to be seen to what extent it can be generalized to other data types.
A template-based protection code generation methodology directed by the Dimensionality Model is discussed in detail. Protection code generation includes four phases: detection, diagnosis, protection code generation and linking. This paper puts emphasis on the automation of diagnosis and protection code generation phases. The Dimensionality Model is used in the diagnosis phase to pinpoint the trigger for a failure. The result is utilized by the code generator to effectively generate protection code.
The cost and development time of software could be significantly reduced if there were a widely used component industry. [I] Automatic robustness hardening might enable more people to use commercial software modules for mission critical applications and safety critical applications, and to reuse legacy software modules for new and existing applications. Although there are many factors that must be addressed in using a COTS software component approach, automated robustness hardening may be one technique that helps developers reduce design costs and improve time to market while producing a robust system.
